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PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Morton White. New York: Oxford University Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 273.

$29.95.
Imagine a 200-year-old tree symbolic of the United States government. The trunk of the tree generates its branches, just as the text of
the Constitution engenders the American form of national government. The roots of the tree draw support from the soil. Similarly, The
Federalist Papers, the roots of the Constitution, drew support from the
rich philosophical milieu of the eighteenth century.
In his new book, Professor Morton White 1 explores this philosophical soil, from which the authors2 of The Federalist culled arguments
favoring the Constitution. White's exploration focuses on the substantive philosophical claims Publius proffered in support pf the Constitution, and on the philosophical procedure Publius employed to arrive at
his substantive conclusions.
As White began his study, he faced two difficulties. First, a lack of
literature presenting a systematic view of The Federalist required
White to conduct extensive research. Of course, that lack of literature
also allows White to proclaim the uniqueness of his work. 3 Second,
presenting the philosophy of The Federalist was "peculiarly difficult"
because Professor White sought "to extract a philosophy" (p. vii) from
a work concerned not with advocating a particular philosophy but
rather devoted to the;: more practical purpose of rallying support for
the ratification of the United States Constitution. In this capacity, The
Federalist "defended some very practical detailed propositions in law
and politics."4
1. Professor, The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey. His current book is
a sequel to M. WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1978), but "a sequel
which may be read and understood by those who have not read its predecessor." P. vii. White
links his current work with its predecessor in chapter 13, entitled "The Federalist and the Declaration of Independence Compared." The chapter concludes that "there is no fundamental philosophical difference between the Declaration and The Federalist." P. 211.
2. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay authored The Federalist Papers.
"Publius" was their collective pseudonym. "The Federalist, addressed to the People of the State
of New York, was occasioned by the objections of many New Yorkers to the Constitution which
had been proposed on September 17, 1787, by the Philadelphia Convention." THE FEDERALIST
xi (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
3. "[S]o far as I know, no other philosopher has ever presented a synoptic view of the major
philosophical ideas in The Federalist." P. vii. White concedes that other authors have written on
individual strands of philosophy in The Federalist. See, e.g., D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THE·
ORY OF The Federalist (1984); D. ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1974); Wright,
The Federalist on The Nature of Political Man, 59 ETHICS 17 (1949). In general, White's
endnotes are a rich source of information on the individual philosophical elements that influenced Publius.
4. P. 3. For an extended argument that The Federalist was merely campaign literature
designed for the practical purpose of ratifying the Constitution, see A. FURTWANGLER, THE
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This practical thrust of The Federalist may cause readers to question the validity of White's abstract exploration. White, however, defends his study against the suggestion that The Federalist and its
authors were influenced only by pragmatism. 5 White argues that the
authors "often used language and expressed ideas which must be examined philosophically if we are to understand the authors adequately" (p. 4). For example, because "no pair of words played a
larger part in the total argument of The Federalist" than "reason" and
"experience" (p. 6), probing their philosophical meaning reveals the
underlying premises of The Federalist.
This need for a theoretical examination motivates White to offer a
portrait of Publius' substantive claims in metaphysics, morals, 6 epistemology, psychology,7 theology, and political technology. Although
White paints his portrait with a broad brush, he narrows his strokes by
noting that the ideas appearing most frequently in The Federalist are
descriptive statements of psychology and political technology.
The authors of The Federalist presented a psychological theory
comparing the strengths of different motives behind individual and
group behavior. Publius believed "hostile passions, immediate interests, and partial interests play a greater part in determining human
action than do friendly passions, long-term interests, group interests,
and reason" (p. 127). For example, Publius stated that "passion never
fails to wrest the sceptre from reason." 8 Because reason was a weak
motive, Publius feared that members of factions and even members of
the gov~rning class would transgress the rational requirements of
moral duty. Consequently, Publius was eager to design a system of
government to check the tendency of passion to override reason.
Publius turned to political technology to argue for a system of government that enabled positive motives and political opportunities to
coincide, while barring congruences between negative motives and
political opportunities. Publius' study of political technology led him
to advocate a federal system of government. The now-familiar strucAUTHORITY OF PUBLIUS (1984). For a summary of Furtwangler's argument, see Book Notice,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1088 (1985).
5. P. 5. White quarrels with the work of Charles Beard, who has concentrated on the practical influences surrounding The Federalist See c. BEARD, THE ENDURING FEDERALISf (1948);
C. BEARD, AN EcONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSfITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1913). White also argues against those who confine philosophy in The Federalist to a theory of
human nature and a view of history.
6. White believes the ethical foundation of The Federalist is underdeveloped in the writings
of Publius. As a result, in chapter 13 he compares the moral systems of The Federalist and the
Declaration of Independence in order to illuminate the ethical framework of The Federalist. Pp.
208-27.
7. In the eighteenth century, psychology was a branch of philosophy and thus remains of
interest to current philosophers. See pp. 7, 9, 197.
8. P. 114 (quoting THE FEDERALISf No. 55, at 374 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).
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ture based on separation of powers plus checks and balances meshed
with Publius' views on human and governmental motivation.
While White presents an in-depth description of the theoretical
background for Publius' views on political technology, he stops short
of appraising the governmental system produced by the technology.
For example, Publius obviously believed that the benefits outweighed
the inefficiencies produced by separation of powers. White, 200 years
later, is in a position to evaluate critically Publius's belief; instead,
White merely describes separation of powers. In general, White leaves
to the reader the task of assessing whether the influence of philosophy
on Publius produced positive or negative consequences for American
government.
According to White, one must analyze the procedure Publius employed to support his substantive claims in order to understand fully
the philosophy behind The Federalist. Publius' methodology comprised a "philosophical hybrid, an offspring of Lockeian rationalism in
morals and Humeian empiricism in politics" (p. 227). Like Locke,
Publius believed in the existence of self-evident ethical maxims that
are established merely by examining relations between ideas. Rationalism in the realm of ethics inheres in Publius' attachment to natural
rights. Natural rights, for example the right to pursue one's liberty
and happiness, followed from "duties that every man has to his Creator and therefore were not attributed to men in empirical statements
but rather in statements ... regarded as truths which could be ·axioms
or theorems in a demonstrative science of morality ... " (p. 34). Publius, in contrast to his rationalism in ethics, appealed to history and
experience in defense of his political theory and technology. In
Number 6, for instance, Publius uses three varieties of experience to
support his argument that private passions of leading individuals
sometimes produce great national events. 9
Despite the appearance of a dichotomy between rationalism in ethics and empiricism in political science, White cautions that Publius did
not always maintain the distinction between the two methodologies. 10
9. The first variety of experience draws on a general knowledge of human nature: In
Number 6 Hamilton writes, "To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties .•• would be to disregard the uniform course of human
events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages." THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at
28 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). The second variety of experience relies on causal state·
ments about past historical events: For example, "[t]he celebrated Pericles, in compliance with
the resentments of a prostitute •.• vanquished and destroyed, the city of the Samnians." Id. at
29 (emphasis in original). The third variety of experience draws on causal statements about
current historical events: "Perhaps however a reference .•• may with propriety be made to a
case which has lately happened among ourselves. If Shays had not been a desperate debtor it is
much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war." Id. at 31
(emphasis in original).
10. In Number 31, for example, Hamilton ~gues that a political proposition, the necessity of
a general power of taxation in the central government, could be established through a Lockeian
system of self-evident propositions. Hamilton writes, "How else could it happen •.• that pro-
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White's cautionary note epitomizes his carefully reasoned analysis, as
he refrains from drawing overly broad conclusions or overs~plifying
the complexities of Publius' work.
In general, Professor White's book is well designed to guide the
reader, especially the busy professor or judge with an interest in philosophy but not an in-depth knowledge, through the philosophy of
The Federalist. White begins each chapter with a road map, and then
divides the chapters into sections with headings designed to summarize the thesis of each section. White also includes a chapter summarizing the philosophy underlying The Federalist (ch. 12).
Unfortunately, two features tarnish White's otherwise excellent
work. First, while White generally exercises proper judgment on the
amount of repetition necessary to make his analysis clear, at times
readers with a background in philosophy or even those paying close
attention will find White's repetition stifling. Second, White seems to
overindulge in truculent criticism of authors with whom he disagrees.
The scholarship of Charles Beard 11 serves as White's favorite foil. 12
But while Beard-bashing becomes annoying, it at least advances the
argument that philosophy had a major influence on Publius.
Overall, White presents an outstanding exploration of the philosophical soil that nurtured both The Federalist and the Constitution.
White's primary contribution lies in weaving together the disparate
substantive and procedural strands comprising Publius' support for
the Constitution. However, the immediate impact of White's book is
lessened because he never explicitly informs the reader of the importance and usefulness of her newly acquired understanding of The
Federalist.
Yet, with a little thought, one can imagine ways in which the lessons of White's book may prove useful to its intended audience. For
example, a knowledge of the philosophical justification for the separation of powers doctrine can aid judges, professors, and students in a
number of ways. Because scholars often bolster their arguments by
citing The Federalist, 13 a reader who comprehends the theoretical rapositions so clear as those which manifest the necessity of a general power of taxation in the
government of the union, should have to encounter any adversaries among men of discernment?"
THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 195 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
11. See supra note 5.
12. For example, White does not mince words in arguing against Beard's position that the
authors of The Federalist were economic determinists:
Madison became attractive to Beard, who seems to have been looking for a way to make his
own method of interpreting the Constitution respectable while acknowledging its similarity
with the views of thinkers in the Marxian tradition. However, had Beard read Number JO
with Hume's essay "Of Parties in General" beside him, he might have seen how distorted an
interpretation of Number 10 he was giving.
P. 75 (emphasis in original).
13. See, e.g., Edwards, Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Divining "Good Behavior" for
Federal Judges, 81 MICH L. REv. 765 (1989) (arguing that Publius' separation of powers theory
supports arguments for judicial independence).
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tionale for separated powers can evaluate the cogency of a given
scholar's position. White's readers will also better understand the theoretical background of recent Supreme Court decisions implicating the
separation of powers doctrine. 14 At a minimum, White's book
presents The Federalist Papers, our "most instructive treatise . . . on
federal government," 15 in a refreshing new light.
-

Edward J. Sebold

14. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (quoting The Federalist No. 47 in
support of the Court's holding that the Comptroller General's role in exercising functions under
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act violated the doctrine of separation of powers); Morrison v.
Olson, 108 S.Ct 2S97, 2622-23 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting The Federalist Nos. 47, Sl,
and 73 to argue that the Independent Counsel provision of the Ethics in Government Act violates separation of powers).
lS. XIX J.S. MILL, CoLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL: EssAYS ON POLITICS AND
SOCIETY SSS (J. Robson ed. 1977).

